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TESTING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES FOR DRUG USE: THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT APPROVES
INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, there has been a massive national movement
against drug use. On September 15, 1986, President Reagan openly declared a war on the use of drugs in the workplace by signing Executive
Order Number 12,564.1 The Order mandates drug testing 2 of federal
employees in "sensitive positions" 3 and requires each agency of the Executive Branch to adopt a policy regarding drug use.4 This action was
later followed by the implementation of the Drug-Free Workplace Act of
1988. 5 Additionally, both the Department of Defense 6 and Department
of Transportation 7 have promulgated anti-drug rules and regulations.
1. 3 C.F.R. §§ 100, 101 at 224 (1986).
2. The testing is for illegal "narcotic drugs" as that term is defined by the Controlled
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802 (Supp. V. 1987). The term illegal "narcotic drugs" does
not include the use of a controlled substance pursuant to a valid prescription. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7301 (Supp. V 1987). The mandatory guidelines for federal workplace drug testing programs was promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 53 Fed. Reg.
11,970-89 (April I1,1988).
3. "Sensitive" positions include those with access to classified information, presidential appointees, law enforcement officers, positions dealing with national security, and
"other functions requiring a high degree of trust and confidence." 3 C.F.R. §§ 100, 101 at
229 (1986).
4. Id.
5. 41 U.S.C. A. § 701-706 (West Supp. 1989). The Act requires that in order for an
employer to be awarded a federal contract or grant of $25,000 or more, he must certify
that he will provide a drug-free workplace by: (1) establishing a statement notifying employees about the prohibition of controlled substances in the workplace, and the sanctions
imposed for such a violation; (2) establishing a drug-free awareness program; (3) providing a copy of the statement to each employee; (4) notifying the employee that his employment is conditioned upon his abiding by the statement and that the employee must notify
the employer within five days of a drug statute conviction for a violation occurring in the
workplace; (5) notifying the contracting or granting agency within ten days after receiving
notice of an employee drug statute conviction; (6) imposing a sanction on the convicted
employee or require his participation in a drug abuse assistance or rehabilitation program;
and (7) making a good-faith effort to maintain a drug-free workplace. See id. at § 701.
6. 53 Fed. Reg. 37,763 (1988) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. § 223). Employers entering into a contract with the Department of Defense ("DOD") must certify their intention
to maintain a drug-free workplace. The employer must agree to provide for: (1) an employee assistance program which includes drug education, counseling and rehabilitation;
(2) training for supervisors to detect drug abuse; (3) a referral system, including both self
and supervisory referrals, for substance abuse treatment; and (4) procedures for identifying illegal drug users. The DOD regulations also mandate drug-testing for employees in
"sensitive positions." Generally, "sensitive positions" include those having access to classified material or those requiring a "high degree of trust and confidence" due to national
security concerns. The DOD regulations do not specify when drug testing must be conducted - i.e., applicant screening, post-accident, etc. It is up to the employer to determine the extent and criteria for testing. The DOD rules generally do not apply to
contracts for commercial goods or contracts performed outside the United States, nor do
they apply if they conflict with state or local law or existing collective bargaining agreements. Id.
7. 53 Fed. Reg. 47,002 (1988)' (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 40). Employees of private and public transportation companies and employees in safety-sensitive or securityrelated jobs must also be tested under the Department of Transportation ("DOT") rules.
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Admittedly, drug use in this country is a real and dangerous problem. A study c6nducted by the National Institute on Drug Abuse concluded that between 10% and 23% of all workers abuse drugs on the
job. 8 Additionally, according to the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental
Health Administration, in 1986 alcohol and drug abuse cost industries
up to $100 billion in lost productivity, caused three times more absenteeism and five times more workers' compensation claims. 9 The fact
that drug use is a devastating problem is not disputed. The real issue is
what means may constitutionally be used to detect such use. While
mandatory drug testing seems to be an attractive solution, it may open a
Pandora's box of legal and ethical considerations. Two recent Supreme
Court decisions' 0 explored the constitutionality of drug testing programs in both the Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA") and the
United States Customs Service ("Customs Service"). In both cases, the
Court held that the government's testing of employees in law enforcement and safety-sensitive jobs did not violate the fourth amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. I I Neither of
the programs conditioned their test requirements upon the production
of a warrant or the presence of individualized suspicion.
Although drug testing has been prevalent in the government sector 1 2 for nearly a decade, 13 some level of individualized suspicion has
The regulations apply to industries regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Highway Administration, Urban Mass Transit
Transportation Administration, the United States Coast Guard, and Research and Special
Projects Administration. The industries must conduct random drug testing of employees
in safety or security-related positions for the presence of marijuana, cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, and phencyclidine ("PCP"). Employers are required to develop and maintain
clear, well-defined procedures for collecting and analyzing urine specimens. The tested
workers must be given written instructions regarding their responsibility to provide a
urine sample. Test results are reviewed by the employer's medical officer. If an employee
tests positive, he must be given an opportunity to respond. The DOT rules, unlike DOD
rules, preempt state and local laws and collective bargaining agreements. In addition to
the DOT regulations, each administration operating under the DOT may promulgate their
own rules. Id.
See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text for further discussion of the Federal Railroad Administration regulations.

8. D.

Copus, MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE:

ALCOHOL AND DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE

(2d

ed. 1987).
9. Id. at 6.
10. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989), rev'k 839 F.2d
575 (9th Cir. 1988); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384
(1989).
11. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of all people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. This note is concerned only with governmental testing programs. For a discussion of drug testing by private employers see Note, Employee Drug Testing-Issues Facing Privale Sector Employers, 65 N.C.L. REV. 832 (1987). For a discussion of issues relating to
private employers that have been awarded federal contracts or grants see D. Copus, ALCOHOL AND

DRUGS AT WORK:

A MANUAL

FOR FEDERAL CONTRACTORS AND GRANTEES

(1989).
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generally been required.14 This note will focus on historical fourth
amendment analysis, the significance of the Skinner and Von Raab decisions regarding other drug testing programs, and will attempt to reconcile such programs with the fourth amendment.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Fourth Amendment Analysis

The essential purpose of the fourth amendment is to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary and unreasonable
intrusions by the government. 15 This right has been recognized as one
16
which is "basic to a free society."'
Specifically, the fourth amendment protects against two types of intrusions - "searches" and "seizures." 17 A search is an infringement on
an expectation of privacy 18 that society is prepared to consider reasonable.19 A seizure of property occurs when there is a "meaningful inter20
ference with an individual's possessory interest in that property."
Although courts have historically applied fourth amendment protections
only to intrusions of property, this right has been extended to protect a
21
person's physical integrity as well.

The fourth amendment does not prohibit all searches and seizures,
only those which are "unreasonable." 2 2 Except for a few well-defined
exceptions, a constitutional search requires the procurement of a war23
rant based upon a showing of probable cause.
A central question in fourth amendment cases, therefore, is to determine whether the search was "reasonable." If the search was conducted pursuant to a warrant, it is presumed to be reasonable because a
neutral magistrate has objectively evaluated its reasonableness in advance to protect individual privacy interests. 24 A more difficult question
arises when a warrantless search has been conducted.
The Supreme Court has attempted to define what is "reasonable:"
13. See Note, Random Drug Testing in the Government Sector. A Violation of Fourth Amendment Rights?, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1988).

14. See McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d
668 (8th Cir. 1982); Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264
(7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029; Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507
(D.N.J. 1986).
15. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.

523 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
16. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767 (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)).
17. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
18. The "expectation of privacy" doctrine was developed in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
19. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
20. Id.
21. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. "The fourth amendment protects people, not places." Id.
22. Security & Law Enforcement Employees v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 201 (1984) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925)).
23. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987); Katz, 389 U.S. at 356; Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 529-30 (1967).
24. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
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The test of reasonableness under the fourth amendment is not
capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each
case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search
against the invasion of personal rights the search entails.
Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the
manner in which it is conducted, the justification
for initiating,
25
and the place in which it is conducted.
The determination of "reasonableness" therefore involves balancing the government's interests against the intrusiveness of the search on
26
the individual's fourth amendment rights.
The intrusiveness of the search must be viewed in the context of the
individual's expectation of privacy.2 7 First, a person must have an actual, subjective expectation of privacy. Second, the expectation must be
one that society finds reasonable. A further determination of reasonableness is then made by looking at whether the search was justified at its
inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the intrusion in the first place. 28 Whether the
search was justified at its inception requires a balancing of the individual's expectation of privacy with the governmental interest which allegedly justified the intrusion. To justify the search, the government must
be able to point to specific and articulable facts, together with rational
inferences judged against an objective standard - i.e., would a reasonable person have thought the action appropriate? 29 Anything less
would be a "hunch" and constitute an unreasonable intrusion on fourth
30
amendment rights.
Although the government is generally required to obtain a warrant
based upon probable cause before it may conduct a search, 3 1 probable
cause is not an "irreducible requirement" of a valid search.3 2 In certain
circumstances, warrantless searches are valid even though suspicion did
not rise to the level of probable cause.3 3 These exceptions are based on
the "special needs" of the government (the "Special Needs Exception").
Both warrant and probable cause requirements are dispensed with when
"special needs, beyond the need for law enforcement ....[make them]
impracticable."31 4 These cases are generally rationalized by exigent circumstances, 3 5 such as the risk that evidence will be destroyed while a
25. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
26. Although the fourth amendment technically applies only to the federal government, its application has been extended to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
27. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

28. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
29. Id. at 21.
30. Id. at 22; see also Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1982).

31. See supra note 23.
32. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
33. Id.; see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
34.

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackman, J., concurring).

35. Such exceptions include the "automobile exception," hot pursuit, stop and frisk,
plain view, border searches, administrative searches of closely regulated industries, inven-
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warrant is being obtained. 36 Additionally, the warrant requirement may
be dispensed with if "the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frus'3 7
trate the governmental purpose behind the search."
Warrantless searches have also been held valid in closely regulated
industries (the "Administrative Exception"). 38 The premise of allowing
these searches is that the pervasive regulation of the industry diminishes
the employees' expectation of privacy. 39 Warrantless searches may also
be constitutional when they are necessary to further a regulatory scheme
which is sufficiently comprehensive and defined so that the individual is
40
aware that he may be subject to such a search.
Furthermore, in Administrative Exception cases, there is generally a
cogent federal interest in promoting public health and safety. 4 1 Requiring a warrant would, in many cases, frustrate that purpose. 4 2 The regularity and certainty of a comprehensive regulatory inspection scheme is a
constitutionally valid substitute for a warrant because it safeguards individual privacy interests. 43 It is under the Special Needs and Administrative Exceptions that the government justified its warrantless searches in
44
Skinner and Van Raab.
B.

The Historical Drug Testing Cases

The taking of blood samples, 45 and urine samples 4 6 constitutes a
search and seizure under the fourth amendment. Additionally, breath
tests have also been held to be a search and seizure. 4 7 The drug testing
cases, therefore, require a fourth amendment balancing of individual
48
privacy interests against the asserted governmental interests.
Cases involving the intrusiveness of warrantless drug testing have
gone both ways. 4 9 One of the first cases to deal with this issue was detory searches, searches of children's possessions at school, and consent. See Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 583 n. I1(9th Cir. 1988) (citing cases).
36. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24 (threat of immediate danger to police officer); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
37. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
38. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (mines); United States v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311 (1978) (guns); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970)
(liquor); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 986
(1987) (horseracing).
39. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
40. Id. at 600.
41. See supra note 38.
42. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603.
43. Id.
44. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414 (1989); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390 (1989).
45. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
46. Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976);
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
47. Skinner, 109 S.Ct. at 1412.
48. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 50-69 and accompanying text. But see supra note 14 (requiring some
level of individualized suspicion).
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cided in 1976.50 In Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Chicago Transit Authority's ("CTA") rules requiring
bus drivers to submit to blood and urine tests after serious accidents or
upon a suspicion of intoxication or being under the influence of
drugs. 5 1 The court applied the balancing test 5 2 and found that the state
had advanced its compelling public safety interest by insuring the drivers fitness for duty. Furthermore, the court concluded that bus drivers
53
have no reasonable expectation of privacy.
Likewise, in Allen v. City of Marietta,54 the court found that requiring
government employees engaged in extremely hazardous work to submit
to urine tests was reasonable. 5 5 There was evidence that the tested employees had used drugs while on duty thereby creating a threat to the
public. 56 Because there was actual evidence of the employees' drug use,
the test was clearly based on reasonable suspicion.
It was not until July 1986 that a court first upheld a random drug
testing program of civilian employees. 57 In Shoemaker v. Handel, regulations promulgated by the NewJersey Racing Commission required jockeys to undergo breath and urine testing to detect alcohol or drug use. 58
A warrant was not required because the search fell within the Administrative Exception. 59 The governmental interest advanced was assuring
the public of the integrity of persons involved in the horse-racing industry. 60 The jockeys, on the other hand, asserted that random drug testing without suspicion violated their fourth amendment rights. The
court, however, found that the jockeys had a diminished expectation of
privacy since horse-racing was one of the most highly regulated industries in the state. 6 1 Additionally, safeguards were provided against invasions of the jockeys' privacy interests in that the State Racing Steward
62
had no discretion in conducting the test.
Warrantless drug testing cases subsequent to Shoemaker generally
required some level of individualized suspicion before an employee
could be subjected to a drug test. 6 3 However, in 1987, the United States
50. Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1977).
51. Id. at 1266.
52. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
53. Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1267.
54. 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
55. Id. at 491.
56. Id. at 495.
57. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3rd. Cir. 1986). For a discussion of the
history of drug testing cases, see Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and the Privacy Rights of

Subject Employees: Toward a General Rule of Legality Under the FourthAmendment, 48 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 201 (1986).

58. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1138-39.
59. Id. at 1142.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1141-42.
62. Id. at 1143.
63. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726
(S.D. Ga. 1986) (finding mandatory periodic drug testing of police employees holding crit-
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97

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit followed the Third Circuit's lead
by upholding the validity of a random drug testing program. 64
In McDonnel v. Hunter, Department of Corrections employees having
day-to-day contact with prisoners were required to submit to a urinalysis either by random selection or on the basis of reasonable suspicion. 6 5 When based upon suspicion, the court determined that
reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause was the appropriate
standard. 6 6 The warrantless searches also fell under the Administrative
Exception. 6 7 The court found that the state had a significant interest in
safeguarding its correctional institutions while the employees had a reduced justifiable expectation of privacy. 6 8 Additionally, the court felt
that urinalysis was the least intrusive method of detecting drug use. 69
II.

A.

RAILWAY LABOR EXECUTIVES Ass'N V. SKINNER

Facts

The Railway Labor Executives' Association ("RLEA") and its various member labor organizations brought suit to enjoin two Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA") regulations that provide for warrantless
drug testing of certain employees without individualized suspicion. One
regulation ("Subpart C") 70 mandates blood and urine tests for employees involved in a major accident, 7 1 an "impact" accident 72 or a fatal accident. 73 The other regulation ("Subpart D") 74 authorizes, but does
not require, breath or urine tests 75 of certain employees if: (1) a superical jobs unreasonable absent individualized suspicion); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga,
647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (finding mass drug testing of firefighters unreasonable
absent individualized suspicion); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J.
1986) (finding mass drug testing of firefighters unreasonable without individualized
suspicion).
64. McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
65. Id. at 1308.
66. Probable cause, in the administrative search context, is not established by a
"quantum of evidence;" it merely refers to a "requirement of reasonableness." Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877 n.4 (1987). In other contexts, probable cause is used to
refer to "a quantum of evidence for the belief justifying the search, to be distinguished
from a lesser quantum such as 'reasonable suspicion.' " Id.
67. McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1308. Reasonable suspicion requires that suspicion be
based on specific objective facts and rational inferences based on experience. See also
Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1982).
68. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
69. McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1308.
70. 49 C.F.R. § 219.201-.213 (1988).
71. A "major" train accident is one involving one or more of the following: (1) a
fatality; (2) a release of hazardous materials accompanied by an evacuation or a reportable
injury (e.g., from fire, explosion, inhalation, or skin contact with the material); or (3) damage to railroad property of $500,000 or more. 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(1) (1988).
72. An "impact" accident is one resulting in: (1) a reportable injury; or (2) damage to
railroad property of $50,000 or more. 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(2) (1988).
73. A "fatal" train accident is one that involves a fatality to any on-duty railroad employee. 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(3) (1988). However, no test is required in the case of a
collision between railroad stock and a motor vehicle or other highway conveyance at a
rail/highway grade crossing. 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(b) (1988).
74. 49 C.F.R. § 219.301-309 (1988).
75. 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(a) (1988).
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visory employee has a reasonable suspicion that the employee is currently under the influence of, or impaired by, alcohol or a controlled
substance; 76 (2) the employee has been involved in a reportable accident
or incident and the supervisory employee has a reasonable suspicion
that the employee's acts or omissions contributed to the occurrence or
severity of the accident or incident; 77 or (3) the employee violated a
78
safety regulation.
The district court granted summary judgment for the government
and upheld the validity of the testing procedure. Although railroad employees have an interest in the "integrity of their bodies" which deserves
protection under the fourth amendment, 79 the court found this interest
was outweighed by the government's substantial interest in promoting
railroad safety. 80 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, 8 1 holding that a "particularized suspicion is essential" to
finding toxicological testing of employees reasonable.8 2 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
B.

Supreme Court Decision
1.

Majority Opinion

First, the Court determined that the blood and urine tests were at76. For a breath test, the supervising employee must reasonably suspect that the employee is currently under the influence of, or impaired by, alcohol or alcohol in combination with a controlled substance. Reasonable suspicion must be based upon specific,
personal observations that the supervisory employee can articulate concerning the appearance, behavior, speech, or body odors of the employee. 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(b)(1) (1988).
For a urine test, the supervisory employee must have a reasonable suspicion that the employee is currently under the influence of or impaired by alcohol or a controlled substance,
based on specific personal observations that the supervisory employee can articulate concerning the appearance, behavior, speech, or body odors of the employee. However, an
employee may be subjected to a urine test only if the determination is made by at least two
supervisors, at least one of whom must have received at least three hours of training in the
signs of drug intoxication. 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(c)(2) (1988).
77. 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(b)(2) (1988).
78. 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(b)(3) (1987). The employee must have been involved in one
of the following operating rule violations or errors: (1) noncompliance with a train order,
track warrant, timetable, signal indication, special instruction or other direction with respect to movement of a train that involves: (A) occupancy of a block or other segment of
track to which entry was not authorized; (B) failure to clear a track to permit opposing or
following movement to pass; (C) moving across a railroad crossing at grade without authorization; or (D) passing an absolute restrictive signal or passing a restrictive signal without stopping (if required); (2) failure to protect a train as required by a rule consistent with
§ 218.37 of this title; (3) operation of a train at a speed that exceeds the maximum authorized speed by at least ten (10) miles per hour or by fifty percent (50%) of such maximum
authorized speed, whichever is less; (4) alignment of a switch in violation of a railroad rule
or operation of a switch under a train; (5) failure to apply or stop short of derail as required; (6) failure to secure a hand brake or failure to secure sufficient hand brakes; or (7)
in the case of a person performing a dispatching function or block operator function, issuance of a train order or establishment of a route that fails to provide proper protection for
a train.
79. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1410 (1989).
80. Id.
81. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988).
82. Id. at 587.
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tributable to the government.8 3 The Court found that a railroad that
complies with Subpart C does so by compulsion of sovereign immunity,
thereby coming within fourth amendment coverage. 8 4 Furthermore, by
promulgating Subpart D, the government conferred a right upon the
FRA to receive biological samples and test results.8 5 Moreover, the
Subpart D regulations preempted state law and was intended to supersede collective bargaining agreements. 8 6 The Court concluded that the
government had more than a passive role with respect to the testing,
87
thereby implicating the fourth amendment.
The second issue was whether the drug tests were searches8 8 or
seizures. 89 The Court held that the blood tests, urinalyses, and breath
tests all constituted searches under the fourth amendment. The tests
intruded on an individual's expectation of privacy which society had recognized as reasonable.9 0 The Court also found that the tests failed to
constitute a seizure because they did not interfere with the employee's
freedom of movement.
The third issue was whether the warrantless drug testing of employees without individualized suspicion was reasonable under the fourth
amendment. While acknowledging that a warrant is generally required
to make a search reasonable, 9 ' the Court noted that sometimes "special
needs, beyond normal law enforcement may make the warrant and probable cause requirements impracticable." '9 2 To ascertain whether the
Government had a "special need" the Court balanced the intrusion on
the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of legitimate gov93
ernmental interests.
The interest advanced on behalf of the government was ensuring
the safety of railroad passengers. 94 RLEA did not dispute the fact that
employees subject to testing held safety sensitive positions9 5 and the
Court recognized public safety as a valid interest.9 6 However, the Court
had to determine if that interest was strong enough to justify an intrusion on the employees' privacy absent a warrant.
83. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1411-12 (1989). The
fourth amendment is only applicable to the government, its agents or instruments. Therefore, the railroad had to be acting as an agent or instrument of the government in order
for the intrusion to be analyzed under the fourth amendment.
84. Id. at 1411.
85. Id.
86. Id.

87. Id. at 1412.
88. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying test for definition of "search."
89. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text for a definition of "seizure."
90. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1412. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text regarding
expectation of privacy.
91. Skinner, 109 S.Ct. at 1414.
92. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1414.
93. Id.; see supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text regarding "special needs" and see
supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text regarding balancing tests.
94. Skinner, 109 S.Ct. at 1414.
95. Id.
96. Id.; see also Skinner, 109 S.Ct. at 1402 (noting the extensive problem of drug and
alcohol abuse in the railroad industry).
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The Court noted that the purpose of a warrant is to assure that
searches or seizures are not random or arbitrary. 9 7 Furthermore, a warrant ensures that a search is narrow in scope. 98 Finally, a warrant requires that a neutral magistrate determine whether the intrusion is
justified. 9 9
The Court found that requiring a warrant under the circumstances
would not further these aims.' 0 0 The Court reasoned that the regulations were specific and well-known to the employees and that they required little discretion to administer. 10 Moreover, while time was spent
obtaining a warrant, evidence of the metabolites of the drugs may be
0 2
destroyed.'1
The Court compared Skinner to other cases where the warrant requirement was found to be inappropriate. 10 3 It observed that railroad
supervisors were not familiar with the "intricacies of... Fourth Amendment (sic) jurisprudence" 0 4 and held that a warrant was not essential to
05
make the searches in this case reasonable.1
Even though the Court determined that a warrant was not required,
warrantless searches generally require "some quantum of individualized
suspicion" to make the search reasonable. 10 6 However, the Court noted
that such a requirement was not a "constitutional floor" beyond which a
search would be unreasonable. 10 7 The Court also stated that when an
individualized suspicion requirement may jeopardize a valid governmental interest, the search should be upheld despite the absence of an
individualized suspicion.' 0 8
The Court then weighed the asserted individual privacy interests
and found that neither the blood test,' 0 9 the urinalysis"I 0 nor the breath
test"' l was a significant intrusion on those interests. Furthermore, the
Court established that the employees had a diminished expectation of
privacy because they were employed in a pervasively regulated indus97. Id. at 1415.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1415-16.
103. Id.; see also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (hospital administrator not
required to obtain warrant to search employee's office); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325 (1985) (school official not required to obtain warrant before searching students' personal belongings).
104. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1416.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1417.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. The intrusion resulting from the taking of blood tests is "not significant ... [and]
such tests are common place." Id.
110. The Court was most concerned with the urine tests but ultimately found that because there was no direct observation and because the test was conducted in a medical
environment, the intrusiveness of the collection was reduced. Id. at 1418.
111. Breath tests are conducted with "a minimum of inconvenience or embarrassment." Id. at 1417.
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try.11 2 These privacy interests were balanced against the government's
interest in preventing harm to railroad passengers from employees in
safety-sensitive positions. The Court held that the government interest
outweighed the individual interest and, therefore, displaced the individualized suspicion requirement."13 Finally, the Court asserted that the
regulations would also detect and deter drug use.
2.

Concurring Opinion

Justice Stevens concurred that the government's interest significantly outweighed the intrusion on an individual's privacy. 1 4 However,
he disagreed with the majority's rationale that the regulations would deter drug use.1 15
3.

Dissenting Opinion

The dissent, while acknowledging the severity of the drug problem,
criticized the majority for "[allowing] basic constitutional rights to fall
prey to momentary emergencies." ' 1 6 Justice Marshall, joined by Justice
Brennan, suggested that the majority was taking another dangerous step
towards reading the probable-cause requirement out of the fourth
amendment entirely and replacing it with the "special needs" test.' 17
The dissenters also suggested that without the probable cause requirement, the fourth amendment is devoid of the meaning which the framers
intended to give it. 1 18 Furthermore, according to the dissenters, the
probable cause requirement has traditionally been "an indispensable
prerequisite" to conducting searches' 19 and that, even when the "Rorschach-like"12 0 balancing test has been applied, searches have generally
been upheld as reasonable only when supported by probable cause.1 2 1
The majority was further criticized for expanding the "special
needs" exception and allowing the deepest intrusion into individual privacy, all without any level of individualized suspicion. 1 22 While the dissenters did recognize the dangers associated with drug use by
employees in safety-sensitive positions, they stressed that even laudable
3
goals cannotjustify abrogating the express words of the Constitution. 12
112. Id.; see supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text regarding the Administrative Exception to pervasively regulated industries.
113. Id. at 1421.
114. Id. at 1422 (Stevens, J, concurring).
115. Id. ("If the risk of serious personal injury does not deter their use of these substances, it seems highly unlikely that the additional threat of loss of employment would
have any effect on their behavior.").
116. Id. at 1423 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Another opponent of drug testing, George
Lundberg, editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association, labeled such programs
"Chemical McCarthyism." SCIENCE, Nov. 6, 1987, at 744.
117. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1423.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1425.
121. Id. at 1424.
122. Id. at 1425.
123. Id. at 1426. "There is no drug exception to the Constitution, any more than there
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The dissenters also felt that the traditional fourth amendment analysis 12 4 should have been applied instead of the "special needs" balancing test. Under the traditional framework, a warrant could have been
obtained. 125 The dissenters argued that there was actually more than
one search at issue - specifically, the collecting and chemical analysis of
both blood and urine. While the dissenters conceded that exigent circumstances justified the waiver of the warrant for collecting the samples,
they maintained that nothing prevented the employer from obtaining a
warrant before performing the chemical analysis.

12 6

Furthermore, the

dissenters argued that the testing procedures were highly intrusive, and,
therefore, a finding of probable cause was necessary. 1 2 7 The dissenters
said that because the majority allowed a highly intrusive search without
128
any level of suspicion its reasoning was clearly erroneous.
The dissenters also argued that other privacy interests were at stake
because other personal information can be uncovered from tests of bod-

ily fluids.1 2 9 Furthermore, the dissenters suggested that individual privacy rights were invaded further by allowing criminal prosecutors access
to the test results.'

30

The tests themselves were also criticized because
they did not measure current impairment. 1 3 1 Finally, the dissenters
concluded by asserting that the majority's deterrence rationale was sim32
ply absurd. 1
III.
A.

NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION V. VON RAAB

Facts

The National Treasury Employees Union ("NTEA"), a federal employment labor union, brought suit against the Commissioner of the
United States Customs Service ("Service")1 3 3 challenging the constitutionality of the Service's drug-screening program. Employees seeking a
transfer or promotion to a position involving drug interdiction, the carrying of firearms, or the handling of "classified" information 3 4 were
is a communism exception or an exception for other real or imagined sources of domestic
unrest." Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971)).
124. First, has a search taken place? Second, was the search made pursuant to a warrant or undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement?
Third, was the search based on probable cause or validly based on lesser suspicion because it was minimally intrusive? Lastly, was the search conducted in a reasonable manner? Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1429. Not only can drug and alcohol use be discovered but
so can other disorders such as epilepsy, diabetes or clinical depression. Id.
130. Id. at 1431.
131. Id.
132. "It is simply implausible that testing employees after major accidents occur ...
will appreciably discourage them from using drugs or alcohol." Id. at 1432.
133. An important responsibility of the Customs Department is the interdiction and
seizure of contraband, including illegal drugs. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1387 (1989).
134. Id. at 1388.

1990]

DRUG TESTING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

required to submit to urinalysis.13 5 The transfer or promotion was contingent upon giving a urine sample.
NTEA claimed that the testing program violated the fourth amendment because there was no requirement of probable cause or individualized suspicion. The district court held that the testing program violated
the fourth amendment, and, accordingly, enjoined its enforcement. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction 13 6 and held that the testing program constituted a reasonable
search because the government had a compelling interest in detecting
employee drug use and because the search was limited in scope. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
B.

Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinion

After analyzing Skinner, the Court analyzed the instant case on a
similar basis - namely, whether the testing program at issue met the
37
reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment. 1
The government interests advanced were the detection and deterrence of drug use.' 3 8 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy found that
these interests constituted a "special need"' 3 9 which justified dispens140
ing with the warrant and probable cause requirements.
NTEA conceded that a warrant was not required 14 1 but argued that
the testing program should still be based on probable cause. The Court,
however, balanced the government's interests against the intrusion on
individual privacy rights and concluded that the government's need to
conduct suspicionless searches was more important. 1 42 Specifically, the
Court found that the government had a compelling interest in ensuring
that employees involved in drug interdiction have "unimpeachable in135. Two tests are used. Initially, samples are tested using the enzyme-multiplied-immunoassay technique ("EMIT") manufactured by the Syva Company of Palo Alto, California. If a sample tests positive for the presence of marijuana, cocaine, opiates,
amphetamines or phencyclidine ("PCP"), it must be confirmed by using the gas chronography/mass spectrometry technique ("GC/MS"). Id. at 1389. The EMIT test is less expensive but may provide false readings between 5% to 20% of the time. The GC/MS, on
the other hand, is nearly 100% accurate. Rust, The Legal Dilemma, A.B.A.J., Nov. 1, 1986,
51, 52. For further discussion on the methodologies of the EMIT and GC/MS tests see
Symposium on Drug Use in the Workplace, BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED., Feb. 1989; Note, Use and
Abuse of Urinalysis Testing in Workplace: A ProposalforFederalLegislation Limiting Drug Screening,

35 EMORY L.J. 1011 (1986).
136. 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
137. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text regarding the determination of reasonableness by using the balancing test.
138. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390 (1989).
139. Id.; see also supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text regarding "special needs."
140. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1391.
141. Id.The Court affirmed that no warrant was required because the intrusion was
narrowly defined and well-known to the employees. Additionally, the process was automatic and allowed no room for discretion. Therefore, the need for a neutral magistrate to
evaluate special facts was eliminated. Id.
142. Id.
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tegrity and judgment."' 143 Furthermore, the Court found a compelling
governmental interest in protecting the public from promoting an employee with impaired perception and judgment to a position that required the carrying of a firearm. 144 Finally, a governmental interest was
from an employee
also found in protecting "truly sensitive information"
14 5
who might compromise such information.
Balanced against these interests were the rights of individual privacy. The Court determined that Service employees had a diminished
expectation of privacy 14 6 and that, therefore, the government's interest
outweighed the individual's interest. Nevertheless, NTEA maintained
that the program was unjustified because it was not implemented in response to a perceived drug use problem and because the program was
not sufficiently effective. 14 7 The Court, however, upheld the validity of
the suspicionless tests for jobs involving drug interdiction and the use of
firearms. 1 4 8 While the Court seemed to indicate that it might uphold
the testing of employees who handle "truly sensitive" information, 14 9 it
did not specifically decide that issue. 150 The primary issues on remand
were to determine what materials were 51"classified" and which categories
of employees were subject to testing.'
2.

Dissenting Opinion

In a strong dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, argued
that the search upheld in Von Raab was clearly unreasonable. In Skinner,
there was clear evidence of drug and alcohol use and a causal connection between such use and a serious threat to public safety. However,15in2
Von Raab, there was no evidence of drug use by Service employees.
In fact, it appeared in the record that the Commissioner had stated that
153
the Service was, in his opinion, "largely drug free."'
Justice Scalia further argued that the majority was searching in vain
for a problem which could be remedied simply by drug testing. According to Justice Scalia, the majority's parade of horribles - i.e., potential
for bribery, employees unsympathetic to their mission of drug interdiction, and impairment of perception or judgment - are pure specula143. Id. at 1393.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1396.
146. Id. at 1394.
147. Id. Indeed, only 5 out of 3600 employees tested positive. Additionally, NTEA
claims employees can avoid detection by abstaining for a few days before the test or by
adulterating their sample. Id.
148. Id. at 1396.
149. Id. "We readily agree that the Government has a compelling interest in protecting truly sensitive information from those who, under compulsion of circumstances or for
other reasons .... might compromise [such] information." Id. (quoting Department of
Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988)).
150. The Court remanded the issue to the court of appeals.
151. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1398.
152. Id. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 1400.
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tion.' 54 Instead, Justice Scalia contended that the government's true
interest was to set an example with the Service's testing program in response to a societal problem rather than to remedy an existing problem
55
in the Service.1
While Justice Scalia acknowledged that there are valid exceptions to
the requirement of particularized suspicion, the exceptions are generally
based on well-demonstrated evils in the specific field. 156 The dissenters
argue that in Von Raab there was no such demonstration and the testing
was allowed only to remedy a general social harm. 15 7 The dissenters
recognized that while eliminating drug use may be a commendable goal,
it is an unacceptable justification for invading an individual's fourth
58
amendment rights.'
Justices Marshall and Brennan also dissented for the reasons stated
in Justice Scalia's dissent and for the reasons set forth in the dissenting
opinion in Skinner.
IV.

COMMENTS

The Supreme Court trivialized the fourth amendment protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures by its pronouncements in
Skinner and Von Raab. While courts have been almost unanimous in requiring some level of individualized suspicion before allowing mass
drug testing,' 5 9 railroad workers and Service employees may now be
subjected to intrusive searches without any showing of particularized
suspicion.
However, the impact of the Skinner and Von Raab decisions may not
be as devastating as it initially seems. The government was not given
carte blanche to test all governmental employees in all cases. These decisions are limited to safety-sensitive positions,' 60 drug interdiction positions,161 positions requiring the carrying of firearms, 16 2 and positions
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1401 ("To be sure, there is only a slight chance that it will prevent some
serious public harm resulting from Service employee drug use, but it will show to the
world that the Service is 'clean,' and.., will demonstrate the determination of the Government to eliminate this scourge of our society!").
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. ("[T]he impairment of individual liberties cannot be the means of making a
point; that symbolism, even symbolism for so worthy a cause as the abolition of unlawful
drugs, cannot validate an otherwise unreasonable search.").
159. In 1986, Shoemaker and McDonnel were decided. These cases clearly fell within the
administrative exception to highly regulated industries. See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text. Additionally, many courts viewed Shoemaker as an aberration. See Note, Random Drug Testing in the Government Sector.: A Violation of Fourth Amendment Rights? TUL. L. REv.

1373, 1383; see also American Fed'n of Government v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 735
(S.D. Ga. 1986) ("The facts of Shoemaker are distinguishable from the facts before the court
and, as the trend of recent cases indicates, the decision does not seem to be in keeping
with the prevailing case law.").
160. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1421 (1989).
161. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1394 (1989).
162. Id.
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involving access to classified information.' 6 3 The Court did not define
which "safety-sensitive" positions are subject to testing' 64 nor did it discuss random drug testing. The exclusion of a discussion on random
testing is significant because current Department of Transportation regulations 16 5 mandate random drug testing. The Court limited its decision to the specific facts of each case.
It appears from Skinner and Von Raab that the Court is all too willing
to disregard the requirement of reasonable individualized suspicion in
drug testing cases. However, cases decided subsequent to Skinner and
Von Raab may provide some clue as to whether the requirement will be
read out completely.
One of the first cases decided after Skinner and Von Raab upheld the
validity of drug testing as a part of a routine medical examination. 166 In
Jenkins v. Jones, 167 a school bus attendant involved in the transportation
of handicapped children brought suit to enjoin the use of a urinalysis
testing program. In light of Skinner and Von Raab, the Court found that
the government had a legitimate interest in the children's safety which
outweighed the individual's expectation of privacy. It must be noted,
however, that a reasonable suspicion of drug use did exist.
Random drug testing was also recently addressed in Hartness v.
Bush.' 6 8 In that case, employees of the Executive Office of the President
and the General Services Administration sought to enjoin a drug testing
program. The program required urinalysis of employees in "sensitive"
and safety-related positions. The court was unwilling to allow random
testing since there was no reasonable, articulable and individualized suspicion of drug use. The court observed that, as a result of Skinner and
Von Raab, particularized suspicion was not a requirement in performing
mass drug tests, however, the court concluded that there must still be
some sort of generalized suspicion.1 69 Because neither individualized nor
generalized suspicion was present, the random drug testing program
70
was enjoined. 1
Probably the most significant decision handed down after Skinner
and Von Raab dealt with the Department ofJustice's random drug testing
program.171 The challenged program required prosecutors in criminal
cases, employees with access to grand jury proceedings, and personnel
holding top secret national security clearances to be subject to random
72
urinalysis. 1
163. Id. at 1398.
164. The Court did not give an indication as to what it thought about positions requir-

ing a "high degree of trust and confidence" such as are included in the Department of
Defense regulations and the Drug Free Workplace Act.
165. See supra note 7.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Jenkins v. Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1633 (1989).
Id.
712 F. Supp. 986 (D.D.C. 1989).
Id. at 991.
Id. at 994.
Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

172. Incumbents serving under Presidential appointment and incumbents whose duties

1990]

DRUG TESTING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

107

Like Von Raab, the governmental interests advanced were the integrity of the workforce, public safety, and protection of sensitive information.' 7 3 With respect to the integrity interest, the court noted that the
government may only search its employees "when a clear [and] direct
nexus exists between the nature of the employee's duty and the nature
of the feared violation."' 174 No such nexus existed in this case. Consequently, the court found that the integrity interest could not justify the
testing.
The court likewise held that the public safety interest was not a sufficient justification. The court distinguished the public safety rationale
in Von Raab and Skinner from that advanced by the Justice Department.
Von Raab dealt with the immediacy of the threat while in the Justice Department, "the chain of causation between misconduct and injury is con75
siderably more attenuated." 1
The only governmental interest which was held to justify the intrusion of drug testing was the protection of confidential information. Citing Von Raab the court found that "truly sensitive" information most
assuredly includes top national security information.1 76 The court held
that employees with top secret national security clearance may be sub77
ject to random drug testing.1
The Harmon decision is significant for two reasons. First, it clarifies
the "classified information" interest advanced in Von Raab. Second, it
addresses the validity of random drug testing programs, something both
Von Raab and Skinner refused to do. The Harmon decision carefully limited the scope of the confidential information interest and recognized
that "truly sensitive information . . . cannot include all information

78
which is confidential or closed to public view."1
Since the Department ofJustice's random drug testing program was
upheld, similar programs in the Department of Education' 79 and
the Department of Transportation 8 0 have also been upheld as
constitutional.

V.

CONCLUSION

It appears that courts are willing to sacrifice the fourth amendinclude "maintaining, storing or safeguarding a controlled substance" are also subject to
testing. Id. at 486. None of the plaintiffs was a Presidential appointee, nor responsible for
controlled substances, therefore, the challenge to the drug testing program was limited to
the three delineated positions. Id. at 487.
173. Id. at 489.
174. Id. at 490.
175. Id. at 491.
176. Id. at 491-92.
177. Id. at 492
178. Id.
179. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Cavazos, 721 F. Supp. 1361 (D.D.C. 1989)
(upholding random drug testing of guards, motor vehicle drivers, and employees with

access to sensitive information).
180. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

(upholding random drug testing of employees having a direct impact on public health,
safety or national security).
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ment's individualized particularized suspicion requirement in order to
win the war on drugs.' 8 1 Admittedly, getting rid of drugs is a laudable
goal. However, as the court in Capua v. City of Plainfield i8 2 said:
If we choose to violate the rights of the innocent in order to
discover and act against the guilty, then we will have transformed our country into a police state and abandoned one of
the fundamental tenets of our free society. In order to win the
war against drugs, we must not sacrifice the life of the Constitu8 3
tion in the battle.'
Maury Lauer Cuje

181. See Wermeil, Court's Conservative Majority Begins to Make It's Mark, Wall Street Journal, July 5, 1989, at BI, col. 4.
182. 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D.N.J. 1986).
183. Id. at 1511.

